It’s been some time since I posted a book review. Over the last few months I’ve been reading mostly fiction. I did finally get back into reading history with Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 by Graydon A. Tunstall.
The Eastern Front of both world wars tend to be neglected in American education. The brief lessons on World War I would make one think that Germany single-handedly fought all the Allies. After reading about the tremendous ineptitude of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in this book it doesn’t seem too far from the mark.
In the early chain of events of the Great War the Austro-Hungarians declared war on Serbia and then Russia declared war on Austria-Hungary. These two powers would face each other in massive battles. One of the earliest and bloodiest was the Carpathian Winter campaigns of 1915.
In his book Mr. Tunstall gives details on the three campaigns from an Austro-Hungarian point of view. The utter incompetence of their commanders is well documented within. On top of the difficulties faced by the multi-national forces of the Empire and their lack of a common language was a lack of experienced officers after many were killed in early fights in 1914.
Then you have the insanity of staging massive offensives in the mountains at the height of winter. Supply lines, medical care, and reinforcements became incredibly difficult. Artillery support was nearly impossible as well. More men would die of disease and the elements than from Russian bullets. The supreme commanders seemed to be completely clueless to the actual conditions at the front.
Why fight such a campaign in the first place? Why not wait for spring? Well there are the added complications of over 100,000 troops being trapped behind the Russian lines in Fortress Przemyśl. Additionally Austria-Hungary needed a major victory in order to save their national honor and to keep Italy and Romania from entering the war on the Allied side. These fears and the desperate need to rescue the fort lead to many irrational actions by the Austro-Hungarian leadership.
What resulted was a series of all-out attacks and orders to defend to the last man. Poor communication and poor transportation lead to piecemeal attacks that were easily countered by the Russians. Major operations involving tens of thousands of men would be made by commanders with no idea what the actual battlefield conditions were like.
After three major offensives and over 800,000 casualties spring was slowly approaching with none of the Austro-Hungarian objectives even remotely possible. Their forces looked to be on the verge of collapse.
At this point the Germans staged their own campaign and pulled the Russians out of the Carpathians, saving their allies. From this point there would be much more German influence on the Austro-Hungarian military policies.
Overall the book is very informative and gives a great overview of a neglected part of the Great War. At times it is a little difficult to keep track of all the various armies and regiments, but that understanding is not necessary for the theme of the book. The major problems faced by the commanders and the horrors experienced by the troops are more than apparent. It is difficult to imagine how anyone survived the hellish conditions in the Carpathians at the beginning of 1915. I still can’t believe that the Austro-Hungarians didn’t collapse and surrender to the Russians.
If that had happened, a Russian victory, they would have flowed into and conquered the Hungarian plains and probably knocked Austria-Hungary out of the war. In such a scenario I’m sure that Germany would have sued for peace and reached some sort of negotiated settlement by early 1916. The world would have been a much different place. But it turned out the way it did thanks to the strength of the Austro-Hungarian troops stuck in the middle of hell with uncaring and incompetent commanders squandering their lives.
